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INTRODUCTION
“Arrested, put in the lineup, trying to put dents in my armor. But, I’m
a survivor, plus I’m liver than most. Out on bail, fifty thou’, still riding
with toast.”1

Copyright 2018, by MILTON J. HERNANDEZ, IV.
1. JAY-Z, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT (Roc-A-Fella Records 2001).
Jay-Z is a vocal advocate for bail bond reform and produced a series on the story
of Kalief Browder, a young man who committed suicide after spending three years
on Rikers Island awaiting trial. See Shawn Carter, Jay Z: For Father’s Day, I’m
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On June 20, 2017, Brian Gisclair stood before Judge Harry Cantrell in
the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court in New Orleans, Louisiana.2
The day before, New Orleans police officers stopped a vehicle in which
Gisclair was a passenger.3 The officers claimed they saw a drug deal take
place in the car.4 The police explained that after the transaction, Gisclair
exited the car and discarded a small plastic bag filled with a “white
rocklike substance.”5 The officers arrested Gisclair for felony possession
of cocaine.6
Gisclair was one of 20 recently arrested defendants in Judge Cantrell’s
courtroom that day.7 Each defendant was making their initial appearance
before the court.8 This initial appearance allowed each defendant to meet
with an attorney, hear the charges made against his, and receive a bail
amount.9
Gisclair, like over 85% of criminal defendants in New Orleans, needed
a public defender to represent him.10 Gisclair’s court-appointed attorney
explained to Judge Cantrell that a cash bail was unnecessary because
Gisclair had no prior violent crime convictions, was not a danger to the
community, and would certainly return to court on his trial date.11 Further,
his attorney mentioned that Gisclair had a job interview scheduled that day
with an apartment complex.12 With a job application pending, the attorney
argued, Gisclair was less likely to flee from the jurisdiction of the court if
the judge released him on his own recognizance pretrial.13 Judge Cantrell,

Taking on the Exploitative Bail Industry, TIME (June 16, 2017), http://time
.com/4821547/jay-z-racism-bail-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/M6LC-7637].
2. Bryce Covert, America Is Waking Up to the Injustice of Cash Bail,
NATION (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/america-is-wakingup-to-the-injustice-of-cash-bail/ [https://perma.cc/9UUU-CV3T].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Gisclair was looking for a new job after being laid off four months
earlier. Id. He was a resident of Westwego, Louisiana, where he had lived his
whole life. Class Action Complaint at 5, Caliste v. Cantrell, No. 2:17-CV-06197,
2018 WL 1365809 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2018).
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however, quickly issued a $2,500 bail for Gisclair—the minimum Judge
Cantrell ever orders under his discretion.14
Gisclair could not afford to pay the bail or to contract with a bail
bondsman.15 He did not know anyone who could loan him the money.16
The judge, therefore, remanded him to the Orleans Parish Prison jail.17 For
weeks, Gisclair did not receive any information about his case, and he
could not afford to call his fiancée and children.18 Gisclair remained in jail
for 40 days and appeared in court on three more occasions before the jail
released him.19
Upon leaving jail, Gisclair called the apartment complex employer
with whom he had scheduled the interview.20 After waiting a week to hear
from Gisclair, the employer hired someone else for the maintenance
position.21 Gisclair had to find temporary work and start over his attempt
to build a more stable life for himself and his family.22
Gisclair’s story is just one of many examples of how the for-profit cash
bail system causes tremendous hardships for impoverished defendants.23
Countless others fall into similar difficulties when courts give them a bail
amount that they cannot afford and they are remanded to jail.24
The United States has one of the highest incarceration rates in the
world and has the highest per capita prison population among the world’s
14. Covert, supra note 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. Later, Gisclair and co-plaintiff Adrian Caliste filed a class action
complaint against Judge Harry Cantrell, “seeking a declaratory judgment that
Judge Cantrell’s bond policy, which they assert results in the creation of a
‘modern debtor’s prison,’ and financial conflict of interest are violations of [their]
constitutional rights.” Caliste v. Cantrell, No. 17-6197, 2018 WL 3727768, at *1
(E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2018). The court granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment. Id.
24. See, e.g., NewsClips Database, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., https://university
.pretrial.org/libraryup/newsclips [https://perma.cc/3WMA-WLSC]. The Pretrial
Justice Institute provides a searchable spreadsheet of cases and stories related to
cash bail systems’ detrimental effects on impoverished defendants. Id.; Avianne
Tan, Kalief Browder: The Life and Death of the Man Who Spent 3 Years Without
Trial on Rikers Island, ABC NEWS (June 9, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/US/kalief
-browder-life-death-man-spent-years-trial/story?id=31643296 [https://perma.cc/9T
G9-KUE4].
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major economies.25 Approximately 450,000 of the United States’s county
and city jail detainees—about 70% of the total county and city jail
populations—are still awaiting trial.26 The number of defendants detained
pretrial in the United States is larger than most other countries’ entire
imprisoned population.27 Defendants are frequently detained pretrial for
weeks, months, or even years because they cannot afford to pay the set
bail.28 Louisiana is no exception.29
Louisiana has the second highest per capita incarceration rate in the
country.30 In 2015, approximately 1 of every 100 Louisianans were in

25. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. locks people up at a higher rate than any
other country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com /news
/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-people-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-anyother-country/?utm_term=.bfc795ddcb91 [https://perma.cc/V7DC-42Y4].
26. $elling Off Our Freedom, COLOR OF CHANGE & ACLU’S CAMPAIGN FOR
SMART JUSTICE 6 (2017), https://d11gn0ip9m46ig.cloudfront.net/images/059
_Bail_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/82XG-VCQ3].
27. Compare id., with Highest to Lowest, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www
.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxono
my_tid=All [https://perma.cc/8SXR-TJJ7] (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). Note the
distinction between total prison population, which encompasses all people
detained, and total pretrial detention population, which is the number of people
being detained before trial. See also Covert, supra note 2.
28. $elling Off Our Freedom, supra note 26.
29. See, e.g., L A . J USTICE R EINVESTMENT T ASK F ORCE , L A . J USTICE
REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS (2017). The Louisiana
criminal justice system creates chilling stories of pretrial detention. See generally
NewsClips Database, supra note 24 (searchable spreadsheet of cash-bail stories,
including stories from Louisiana); see also Eve Abrams, If you pass through New
Orleans courts, innocent or not, you still have to pay – 4, NEW ORLEANS PUB. RADIO
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://wwno.org/post/if-you-pass-through-new-orleans-courts-inno
cent-or-not-you-still-have-pay-4 [https://perma.cc/7NW5-773Z] (reporting on
Reuben who, after contracting with a bail bondsman to pay his $5,500 bail, saw a
judge increase his bail by another $5,000, forcing Reuben and his family to pay more
to the bondsman; the court dropped Reuben’s case after he paid the premium on the
second bail); see Katy Reckdahl, Lawsuit accuses New Orleans bail bond company
of overcharging, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (June 19, 2017), http://www.theadvocate
.com/new_orleans/news/courts/article_6398b902-5528-11e7-8707-afdbcde77a50
.html [https://perma.cc/SB36-7XES] (giving a description of the law suit against
Blair’s Bail Bonds, who charged Ronald Egana and his family more than $6,000—
over double the normal premium amount for a bail of Ronald’s size).
30. See John Simerman, ‘Prison capital’ no more: Louisiana sheds long-held
title, but remains above U.S. incarceration rate, ADVOCATE (June 20, 2018),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_65844992-6b53-11e8-
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parish and city jails—nearly triple the national average.31 That same year,
about half of Louisiana’s jail inmates were being detained pretrial.32
Furthermore, nearly all of Louisiana’s pretrial inmates remain in jail
because they have not satisfied their bail payment.33 Spending unnecessary
time in jail threatens the income, job security, and home life of many
criminal defendants.34 Requiring defendants to pay bail, especially
exorbitant amounts, perpetuates problems of poverty, recidivism,
unwarranted guilty pleas, and high incarceration rates.35
Several state, county, and municipal jurisdictions in the United States
have abandoned cash bail systems, which require defendants to pay bail or
risk detention in jail until their trial date.36 These jurisdictions are instead
ac2d-97c9311b1424.html [https://perma.cc/39ZX-QQCY]. At the inception of
this Comment, Louisiana had the highest per capita incarceration rate in the
country. LA. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 29, at 12.
31. Incarceration Trends: Louisiana, VERA INST. JUST., http://trends.vera
.org/rates/louisiana?incarcerationData=all [https://perma.cc/SSL7-646K] (last
visited Aug. 2, 2018). This number is different from and does not include the number
of people detained in Louisiana state prison facilities. Id. Generally speaking, jails are
“[parish or county] operated short-term facilities” that detain defendants “awaiting
trial or sentencing” or have been convicted of misdemeanors, and prisons are “longerterm facilities run by the state or the federal government . . . .” What is the difference
between jails and prisons, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index
.cfm?ty=qa&iid=322 [https://perma.cc/YXY5-9LJ7] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
32. Incarceration Trends: Louisiana, supra note 31. In 2015, of the 28,696
Louisianans that jails detained in these local facilities, they were holding 14,038
of them pretrial. Id.
33. See, e.g., Mathilde Laisne, Jon Wool & Christian Henrichson, Past Due:
Examining the Costs and Consequences of Charging for Justice in New Orleans,
VERA INST. OF JUST. (2017).
34. See, e.g., Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33; The Socioeconomic
Impact of Pretrial Detention, OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE (2010), http://www
.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/a2j-%20Socio
economic%20impact%20of%20PTD%20OSI%20UNDP.pdf [https://perma.cc/X
CU9-8NKH]; Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal Yang, The Effects of Pretrial
Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from
Randomly Assigned Judges (July 2016), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cyang/files
/dgy_bail_july2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V5D-WMMT].
35. See Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33.
36. See generally infra Part II; Josie Duffy Rice, New Jersey passes new bail
reform law, changing lives of poor defendants, DAILY KOS (Jan. 3, 2017),
https://www.daily kos.com/stories/2017/1/3/1616714/-New-Jersey-passes-newbail-reform-law-changing-lives-of-poor-defendants
[https://perma.cc/WLJ87JWD]; Ann E. Marimow, When it comes to pretrial release, few other
jurisdictions do it D.C.’s way, WASH. POST (July 4, 2016), https://www.washing

562

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

adopting risk assessment tools that analyze each defendant’s criminal
history, connections with the community, flight risk, and danger to society
using mathematical algorithms.37 If a defendant is deemed high-risk based
on these considerations, he is detained before his trial.38 If a defendant is
considered low-risk, he is released on his own recognizance,39 and
expected to return to court on his hearing date.40 Risk assessment tools are
less expensive, more efficient, and fairer than cash bail systems for
defendants, courts, and court agencies.41
Louisiana should eliminate its cash bail system and adopt a statewide
risk assessment-based system—the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety
Assessment tool—so courts can calculate which defendants must be
detained and which defendants can be safely released until trial.42
Adopting such a system not only promotes equality by ensuring that courts
do not target indigent defendants indiscriminately, but it also promotes
public safety by ensuring that jails only release low-risk defendants
pretrial.43
Part I of this Comment provides background on the bail system in
general and specifically in Louisiana. Part II discusses recent developments
in bail reform in other jurisdictions around the country, particularly those
adopting risk assessment-based systems. Part III argues that Louisiana
should follow in the footsteps of the jurisdictions eliminating cash bail
systems and adopt a similar risk assessment tool. Part III also analyzes jail
data in Louisiana and argues that there are economic incentives for
Louisiana’s parishes and cities to adopt this new system. This Comment
concludes by imploring the Louisiana Legislature to eliminate the
antiquated, inefficient cash bail system and adopt a risk assessment tool
statewide like the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool.
tonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-release-few-other-jurisd
ictions-do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_stor
y.html?utm_term=.2a5b8a415f53 [https://perma.cc/SFE5-THM9]; PSA Research,
LAURA
&
JOHN
ARNOLD
FOUND.,
http://
www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice/psa-research/
[https://perma.cc/VK9R-BVCC] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
37. See generally supra note 36.
38. See PSA Research, supra note 36.
39. “Release on recognizance” is defined as “[t]he pretrial release of an
arrested person who promises . . . without supplying a surety or posting bond, to
appear for trial at a later date.” Release on Recognizance, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
40. See PSA Research, supra note 36.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See discussion infra Part III.
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I. LOUISIANA’S ARCHAIC CASH BAIL SYSTEM
Cash bail systems, in which defendants must pay a specific amount of
money or face pretrial detainment, are rooted in the foundation of Western
civilizations.44 Anglo-Saxon England, the United States’s common law
predecessor, used bail systems because of a general lack of prisons.45
Without enough prison space, courts needed to be sure that defendants
would return to court when required.46 Jails could release a man accused
of a crime before trial so long as a surety “would guarantee both the
appearance of the accused at trial and payment of [monetary fines] upon
conviction.”47 The court would presume the accused guilty if he fled
before trial, and the surety would be bound to pay the fines attached to the
accused’s conviction.48 When Parliament passed acts limiting the power
of bail, it guaranteed several rights for citizens.49
The founders of the United States brought with them the rights
associated with bail.50 In modern times, states are free to establish their
own bail systems, but may be subject to the limitations imposed by the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required.”51 Indeed, parties have challenged Louisiana’s
bail statutes before and courts have found such claims unmerited—holding
that the statutes do not violate parties’ due process rights.52
44. Gabriel Loupe, Comment, The Lack of Money is the Root of All Evil:
Louisiana’s Ban on Bail Without Surety, 77 LA. L. REV. 109, 111 (2016). “The
practice of bail has a history extending back millennia to the early Roman
Republic.” Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery
of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 519–
20 (1983) (internal emphasis omitted).
48. Id.
49. Loupe, supra note 44, at 112. These included “(1) the Petition of Right,
which forbade courts to detain subjects without charging them; (2) the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679, which created procedural safeguards to prevent lengthy
pretrial delays; and (3) the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which stated that
excessive bail ought not be required.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
52. See Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644, 663 (5th Cir. 2003);
Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014);
but see Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 657 (E.D. La. 2017)
(holding that a judge’s “institutional interest in maximizing fines and fees [was]
substantial” and violated Plaintiff’s due process rights).
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A. Authoritative Discretion to Obligate Defendants
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure governs the bail system in
Louisiana.53 Louisiana law defines “bail” as “the security given by a
person to assure a defendant’s appearance before the proper court
whenever required.”54 Barring particular exceptions,55 any person “in
custody who is charged with the commission of an offense” has the right
to bail.56 At a pretrial bail hearing, a judge determines a particular
defendant’s bail.57 The judge’s goal is to set bail at a value that guarantees
the defendant will return to court for their trial and contemplates the safety
of the community if the defendant is released pretrial.58
To determine a proper bail amount, judges consider ten factors from
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 316.59 Article 313 lists
additional factors that judges must consider when determining bail for
certain offenses.60 Despite the consideration of these factors, however,

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. tit. VIII.
Id. art. 311(1) (2018).
See id. arts. 313(D), 321(C).
Id. art. 312(A).
Id. art. 313.
Id. art. 316.
Id. The ten factors are:
(1) The seriousness of the offense charged, including but not
limited to whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves
a controlled dangerous substance.
(2) The weight of the evidence against the defendant.
(3) The previous criminal record of the defendant.
(4) The ability of the defendant to give bail.
(5) The nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person
or the community that would be posed by the defendant's
release.
(6) The defendant’s voluntary participation in a pretrial drug
testing program.
(7) The absence or presence in the defendant of any controlled
dangerous substance.
(8) Whether the defendant is currently out on a bail undertaking
on a previous felony arrest for which he is awaiting institution
of prosecution, arraignment, trial, or sentencing.
(9) Any other circumstances affecting the probability of
defendant’s appearance.
(10) The type or form of bail.

Id.
60. Id. art. 313(A)(3):
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judges are not required to set a bail for every defendant.61 A judge has
discretion to deny a defendant bail if there is “clear and convincing
evidence” that the defendant would flee from the court’s jurisdiction or
that the defendant’s release would put the community in danger.62
If the judge grants bail instead of releasing the defendant on their own
recognizance or denying bail, the defendant is required to pay the amount
to the court in full.63 The court then holds the payment in “escrow” and
returns it to the defendant if he is not convicted and appears for all required
court dates and hearings.64 If the court eventually convicts the defendant,
the defendant can use the bail payment to pay the fines, fees, and court
costs imposed at sentencing, and the court can return any remaining money
after these additional obligations are met.65 Financial problems may arise
for defendants who cannot pay the full amount when the bail is assigned.66

(3) In addition to the factors listed in Article 316, in determining
whether the defendant should be admitted to bail pending trial,
or in determining the conditions of bail, the judge or magistrate
shall consider the following:
(a) The criminal history of the defendant.
(b) The potential threat or danger the defendant poses to the
victim, the family of the victim, or to any member of the public,
especially children.
(c) Documented history or records of any of the following:
substance abuse by the defendant; threats of suicide by the
defendant; the defendant’s use of force or threats of use of force
against any victim; strangulation, forced sex, or controlling the
activities of any victim by the defendant; or threats to kill.
Documented history or records may include but are not limited
to sworn affidavits, police reports, and medical records.
61. See id. art. 313(A)(4).
62. Id. The statute provides that:
Following the contradictory hearing and based upon the judge’s
or magistrate’s review of the factors set forth in
Subparagraph(A)(3) of this Article, the judge or magistrate may
order that the defendant not be admitted to bail, upon proof by
clear and convincing evidence either that the defendant might
flee, or that the defendant poses an imminent danger to any
other person or the community.
Id.
63. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33, at 5.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Bail, Fines, and Fees, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/research
/bail-fines-and-fees [https://perma.cc/QF7U-HCH9] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
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To avoid pretrial detention, defendants who are unable to pay have a
secondary option: a bail bondsman.67
B. Another Smothering Method of Payment Through Bail Bond Offices
Bail bondsmen are commercial, for-profit, state-licensed agents who
offer bail bonds.68 If a defendant or his family contracts with a bail
bondsman, the bondsman acts as a surety for the defendant, paying the
court the required bail.69 The Louisiana Department of Insurance oversees
the certification of bail bondsman in the state and requires potential
bondsmen to meet certain requirements, enroll in courses, take
examinations, and complete an apprenticeship program.70
Before paying the defendant’s bail, the bondsman requires that the
defendant pay a nominal fee up front, usually called a “premium.”71 The
premium is typically a particular percentage of the set bail.72 In New
Orleans, for example, bondsmen require 10% of a defendant’s bail as a
premium.73 A bail bondsman may also have the authority to collect
additional fees from the defendant for the prosecutor, the sheriff, the public
defender, and the court.74 The premium and fees associated with
contracting a bail bondsman are non-refundable.75 Even if a defendant
makes every court appearance and is never prosecuted or convicted, the
bail bond company never returns the premium or fee payments.76 If a
defendant misses a court appearance or violates another condition of bail,
67. Id.
68. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33, at 6.
69. Id.
70. See LA. REV. STAT. § 22:1574 (2018). To become a bail bond producer, an
applicant must be free of felony convictions and must complete the Apprentice
Program by working for a licensed bail bond producer for three consecutive months.
Id. Applicants must also complete a prelicensing program course before their
apprenticeship is finished. Id. § 22:1571. See generally Bail Bond Apprentice
Program Information, LA. DEP’T INS., https://www.ldi.la.gov/industry/produceradjuster/license-application/bail-bond-apprentice-program [https://perma.cc/X8ZK
-6Q7E] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
71. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33, at 6.
72. Bail, Fines, and Fees, supra note 66.
73. Other cities and parishes around the state also require 10% as a premium. Id.
74. Id. The bail bond office includes the additional fees in the cost assessed
to the defendant and then forwards the payments to these various state agencies
and officials. The bail bond office will often require additional monthly payments
from the defendant. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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the court can remand him to jail and force him to pay additional fees to the
court.77
No matter which method a defendant chooses—paying the court
directly, contracting with a bail bondsman, or not paying the bail and going
to jail—the difficulties are exacerbated if the defendant is impoverished
like over 20% of the state’s population.78 Money that a defendant uses to
pay bail or a bail bondsman could be saved for other necessary expenses,
such as rent, utilities, or groceries.79 If the defendant cannot pay either the
court or a bail bondsman, he is held in jail.80 Withheld from everyday life,
defendants often lose their jobs, homes, cars, or custody of their children
while jailed.81
Louisiana’s “cash bail” system is detrimental to the indigent
population and contributes to the state’s high incarceration rate.82
Louisiana’s poverty rate is exorbitantly high83 and research shows that
requiring excessive bail and nominal fees from defendants perpetuates a
continuing cycle of poverty, potentially wrongfully induces guilty pleas,
and crowds jails.84

77. Id.
78. Louisiana, TALK POVERTY, https://talkpoverty.org/state-year-report
/louisiana-2017-report/ [https://perma.cc/Q786-J2CW] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018)
(reporting 2017 poverty statistics). Over 20% of Louisianans are in poverty. Id.
79. Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money For
Bail, JUST. POLICY INST. 13 (2012).
80. Bail, Fines, and Fees, supra note 66.
81. See generally Bail Fail, supra note 79; Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf,
Detaining the Poor: How money bail perpetuates and endless cycle of poverty and
jail time, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (May 10, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy
.org/reports/incomejails.html [https://perma.cc/V78N-WKWJ]; Shaun OsseiOwusu, Poverty’s Punishment: America’s Oppressive Bail Regime, AM. PROSPECT
(Nov. 18, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/poverty%E2%80%99s-punishmentamerica%E2%80%99s-oppressive-bail-regime
[https://perma.cc/KBB8-58TW];
Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ny
times.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/7YNH-GHJ5];
Robin Steinberg, Time for a national fund that chips away at money bail and stops
criminalizing poverty, USA TODAY (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/opinion/policing/spotlight/2017/11/28/time-national-fund-chips-away-moneybail-and-stops-criminalizing-poverty/890484001/ [https://perma.cc/5KMQ-HP5G].
82. See generally Bail, Fines, and Fees, supra note 66; Laisne, Wool &
Henrichson, supra note 33.
83. Louisiana, supra note 78.
84. See Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33.
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II. JURISDICTIONS ARE ABANDONING CASH BAIL AND MOVING TO RISK
ASSESSMENT
Although Louisiana has the second highest incarceration rate per
capita in the country,85 other states also face problems of mass
incarceration.86 In recent years, many jurisdictions reduced jail
populations and implemented policies so as to not detain defendants
pretrial solely because of an inability to pay.87 These states’ efforts
demonstrate the alternative bail systems available to Louisiana.88
A. New Jersey Eliminates Cash Bail and Adopts the Arnold Foundation’s
Public Safety Assessment Tool
New Jersey had a high pretrial detention rate and a high percentage of
people living in poverty,89 prompting the state to make significant changes
to its bail system in early 2017.90 One study found that at any given point
in time, around 75% of New Jersey’s jail population was simply awaiting
85. See supra note 30.
86. See, e.g., PRETRIAL SERVICES: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
PRETRIAL REFORM IN KENTUCKY (Jan. 2013); First-of-its-Kind New Report Finds
New Jersey Packed With Pretrial Inmates Unable to Pay Often Nominal Bail
Amounts, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.drugpolicy.org
/news/2013/04/first-its-kind-new-report-finds-new-jersey-jails-packed-pretrialinmates-unable-pay-oft [https://perma.cc/W95S-CNDN]; Megan Cassidy, Bond
companies ‘extremely worried’ as Arizona moves away from cash bail bonds,
AZCENTRAL.COM (June 21, 2017), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local
/arizona/2017/06/21/arizona-courts-back-away-cash-bail-system-bond-companiesworried/400209001/ [https://perma.cc/2XCZ-WZ2B]; Jon Schuppe, Post Bail, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform [https://per
ma.cc/4WR2-7NQC].
87. See generally supra note 86.
88. See generally supra note 86.
89. See Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) Program, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/saipe.html [https://per
ma.cc/DKN6-NSR7] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018); Incarceration Trends: New Jersey,
VERA INST. JUST., http://trends.vera.org/rates/new-jersey?incarcerationData=all
[https://perma.cc/6F8A-UTVQ] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). For perspective,
Louisiana has a higher pretrial detention rate and higher poverty rate. New Jersey’s
pretrial detention rate is 178.6 per 100,000 residents and Louisiana’s is 454.8.
Incarceration Trends, VERA INST. JUST., http://trends.vera.org/incarceration-rates
?data=pretrial&geography=states [https://perma.cc/JUA3-LR4A] (last visited Aug. 2,
2018). New Jersey’s poverty rate is estimated at 10.4% and Louisiana’s is estimated
at 20.1%. Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) Program, supra.
90. See, e.g., infra note 94.
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trial.91 Of the pretrial inmates, the average length of incarceration was over
ten months.92 Further, 40% of the defendants in jail were there because
they could not afford bail of $2,500 or less.93
On November 4, 2014, New Jersey voters approved a constitutional
amendment to take effect on January 1, 2017.94 The amendment declared
that, “All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for pretrial release”
and provided the legislature with the power to “establish” a system of
pretrial release.95 Instead of a cash bail system, New Jersey courts now use
a “risk assessment” analytic tool to determine whether a particular
defendant is a flight risk or a danger to society.96
The risk assessment tool, called the “Public Safety Assessment tool”
(“PSA”) is “a pretrial risk assessment tool that is designed to assist judges
in making release/detention determinations.”97 Created by the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation,98 the tool considers a number of factors related
to the defendant to determine whether the court should release or detain
the defendant.99 The factors focus on the defendant’s prior convictions and
91. First-of-its-Kind New Report Finds New Jersey Packed With Pretrial
Inmates Unable to Pay Often Nominal Bail Amounts, supra note 86.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. N.J. CONST. art. 1, ¶ 11; NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, 2017 REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE, https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal
/2017cjrannual.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CR9-ZN58] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018);
Rice, supra note 36; Molly O’Brien, New Bail and Speedy Trial Laws Take Effect
in New Jersey, NEW BRUNSWICK TODAY (Jan. 28, 2017), http://newbrunswick
today.com/article/new-bail-and-speedy-trial-laws-take-effect-new-jersey [https://
perma.cc/7Y82-7X ZN].
95. N.J. CONST. art. 1, ¶ 11.
96. See supra note 94.
97. See supra note 94.
98. See supra note 94. The Arnold Foundation is a private foundation with
initiatives like education, sustainable public finance, and criminal justice. LAURA
& JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/ [https://perma
.cc/8PJK-UVH5] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). The crux of its criminal justice
initiative is a risk assessment analytical algorithm called the “Public Safety
Assessment” tool. Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, LAURA &
JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads
/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf [https://perma.cc/S44E-GE8Q] (last visited
Sept. 30, 2018).
99. Jessica Mazzola & Thomas Moriarty, How bail reform is playing out in N.J.’s
largest city, NJ.COM (May 28, 2017), https://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2017
/05/how_bail_reform_is_playing_out_in_njs_largest_city.html [https://perma.cc/3S
U9-5K4P]; Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, supra note 98; PSA
Research, supra note 36.
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failures to appear, determining the “risk factor” associated with allowing
a defendant to remain out of jail before his trial.100
The Laura and John Arnold Foundation developed the PSA tool by
compiling statistics from more than 1.5 million cases in over 300
jurisdictions throughout the United States.101 Analyzing that data,
developers identified the factors or characteristics most predictive of
whether a defendant will commit a new crime—violent or nonviolent—or
fail to appear in court.102 The factors include, among others: whether the
current offense is violent; whether prior convictions exist; the defendant’s
age at the time of arrest; and the defendant’s history of failure to appear in
court.103 The PSA does not consider factors like race, ethnicity, or
geography.104
Today, after a defendant is arrested in New Jersey, a pretrial detention
officer interviews the defendant.105 The officer reads the defendant’s
criminal record, asks questions to obtain the information needed for the
PSA, and “plugs in” the answers the algorithm requires.106 The tool
outputs a number that determines the defendant’s risk factor, which in turn
determines whether the defendant must remain in jail until trial.107 The tool
computes the defendant’s risk factor by comparing his information to over
1.5 million criminal cases in its databases.108 A judge then reports the
resulting assessment at a hearing for the defendant, which must take place
within 48 hours of the initial arrest.109
If the assessment determines that the defendant is not a risk, the
defendant may return home and is placed in pretrial services.110 The
pretrial services office notifies the defendant of upcoming court dates and
may include monitoring services, such as GPS tracking devices.111 If the
defendant’s assessment number is high, indicating he is a high-risk
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, supra note 98.
PSA Research, supra note 36.
Id.
Id.
Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, supra note 98.
NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, supra note 94; Rice, supra note 36.
See supra note 105.
See supra note 105.
PSA Research, supra note 36.
John DeRosier, Is New Jersey’s new bail reform system actually working?,
PRESS ATLANTIC CITY (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com
/news/crime/courts/is-new-jersey-s-new-bail-reform-system-actually-working/article
_83c8b0ca-7946-5164-a00d-581864614836.html [https://perma.cc/Y3TP-3BES];
NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, supra note 94.
110. See supra note 105.
111. See supra note 105.
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defendant, he is not allowed to leave jail, and instead the court detains him
without bail.112
Since the constitutional amendment, the New Jersey jail population
has decreased, leading reform advocates and state officials to hail the New
Jersey program as a success.113 In July 2017, New Jersey released reports
analyzing the number of people in its jails,114 which showed the number
of pretrial defendants in county jails dropped by more than 33% in
comparison to the year before the bill’s passage.115 Another study found
the pretrial population of New Jersey jails had dropped 20% in the first six
months of the PSA’s usage.116 Following New Jersey’s successful
adoption of the tool, other jurisdictions around the country have also begun
using the tool in their own criminal justice systems.117
B. Other Jurisdictions Are Buying into Risk Assessment
New Jersey is not the only jurisdiction to adopt the Arnold
Foundation’s PSA.118 Over 30 jurisdictions have adopted the tool in some
112. See supra note 105.
113. See, e.g., NEW J ERSEY J UDICIARY, INITIAL RELEASE DECISIONS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ELIGIBLE DEFENDANTS (2017), https://www.judiciary
.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrsummaryrpts.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HBU-2B
CJ]; Katherine Landergan, Months into new system, attorney general toughens N.J.
bail reform rules, POLITICO (May 24, 2017), http://www.politico.com/states/newjersey/story/2017/05/24/months-into-new-system-attorney-general-revises-bail-re
form-rules-112311 [https://perma.cc/RN3T-HF3B].
114. NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, supra note 113.
115. S.P. Sullivan, Here’s how much N.J. jail population fell since bail reform,
NJ.COM (July 26, 2017), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/07/njs_bail
_population_dropped_20_percent_in_6_months.html [https://perma.cc/V6KF-NR
VG]. Another report compared the number of defendants detained pretrial before
and after the reform. In June 2016, jails detained 8,332 defendants pretrial and by
June 2017, five months after the reform, that number had dropped to 5,717.
Schuppe, supra note 86.
116. Sullivan, supra note 115.
117. See Schuppe, supra note 86; PSA Research, supra note 36.
118. See Schuppe, supra note 86. Other jurisdictions that have adopted the
Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool include: the State of Arizona;
San Francisco and Santa Cruz Counties in California; Volusia County in Florida;
Bernalillo County in New Mexico; Allegheny County (contains Pittsburgh) in
Pennsylvania; Pennington and Minnehaha Counties in South Dakota; Kane, Cook
(contains Chicago), and McLean Counties in Illinois; the State of Kentucky;
Mecklenburg County (contains Charlotte) in North Carolina; Lucas County
(contains Toledo) in Ohio; Harris County (contains Houston) in Texas; Yakima
County in Washington; and Dane and Milwaukee Counties in Wisconsin. Id.

572

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

fashion, and some of these jurisdictions demonstrate alternative, lessexpansive approaches compared to New Jersey’s dramatic overhaul.119
Kentucky adopted bail reform throughout the state in January 2017.120
The Kentucky Supreme Court signed an order creating the Administrative
Release Program and adopted three “categories of risk” for use in pretrial
service assessments based on criteria from the PSA risk assessment tool.121
By assigning a score from 2 to 12 to a defendant, the pretrial service officer
reports that the defendant is either a low-, moderate-, or high-risk
defendant.122 The risk categories correspond to a recommended result: jails
release low-risk defendants on their own recognizance with conditions;
jails release moderate-risk defendants on their own recognizance with
supervision; and jails release high-risk defendants only upon judicial
review and with supervision.123 The Kentucky Supreme Court stated that
the purpose of the program was to “expedite pretrial release of low to
moderate risk defendants” and to “reserv[e] resources for higher-risk
defendants.”124 The Supreme Court hoped the program would “increase
efficiency” of its pretrial supervision.125
In Arizona, few courts used pretrial services and a risk assessment
system prior to 2017, but in April 2017, the Arizona Supreme Court urged
judges to embrace a statewide risk assessment system.126 Arizona’s risk
assessment tool is also based on the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety
Assessment tool and relies on nine variables, which include the

119. Schuppe, supra note 86.
120. Authorization for the Non-Financial Uniform Schedule of Bail
Administrative Release Program, Ky. Sup. Ct. Order 2016-10 (2016). Kentucky’s
statewide overhaul followed its earlier, more moderate attempts at bail reform. B.
Scott West, The Next Step in Pretrial Release is Here: The Administrative Release
Program, ADVOCATE , K Y. DEP ’T P UB . ADVOC . (Jan. 2017), https://dpa.ky
.gov/Public_Defender_Resources/The%20Advocate/Advocate%20Newsletter%20
Dec%202016%20(COLOR%20-%20FINAL%20modified%201-23-17).pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZS8-E2XG]. In 2010 and 2011, jails released around 70% of
pretrial defendants, and 90% of those defendants made all future court
appearances. In addition, 92% of those defendants were not re-arrested while on
pretrial release. PRETRIAL SERVICES: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
supra note 86.
121. Ky. Sup. Ct. Order 2016-10.
122. Id.
123. West, supra note 120.
124. Ky. Sup. Ct. Order 2016-10.
125. Id.
126. Cassidy, supra note 86.
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defendant’s prior felony convictions and prior failures to appear within the
last two years.127
Harris County, Texas, also began using the PSA after a federal judge
mandated its implementation.128 Harris County courts came under scrutiny
in early 2017 when arrestees of the county brought suit in federal court
against the county court system and sheriffs alleging violation of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses.129 In ODonnell v. Harris County,
Texas, the district court judge found in favor of the plaintiffs and
overturned the county’s bail system, finding the system disproportionately
affected the county’s indigent populations.130
The judge found that Harris County jails detained 40% of people
arrested on misdemeanor charges from bail hearings until trials were
completed.131 In June 2017, after the United States Supreme Court refused
their request for an emergency block, Harris County officials stated they
would comply with the ruling and allow defendants detained for inability
to pay bail to enter pretrial services.132 Despite Harris County’s reluctance,

127. Id.
128. Schuppe, supra note 86. Harris County includes the City of Houston. See
HARRIS COUNTY, TEX., https://www.harriscountytx.gov [https://perma.cc/N9G2NABE] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). Harris County has almost as many people as
the entire State of Louisiana. Harris County, TX & Louisiana Population
Comparison, 2010 CENSUS INTERACTIVE POPULATION SEARCH, https://www
.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ [https://perma.cc/55HH-UXEC] (select Harris
County, Texas, and search location Louisiana to add to same table). Harris
County’s population is estimated as 4,092,459 and Louisiana’s is 4,533,372. Id.
129. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Tex., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1061 (S.D. Tex.
2017). See Eli Rosenberg, Judge in Houston Strikes Down Harris County’s Bail
System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04
/29/us/judge-strikes-down-harris-county-bail-system.html [https://perma.cc/9TN
X-GP4Q].
130. ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1150–51. See Rosenberg, supra note 129.
131. Rosenberg, supra note 129.
132. The Latest: Harris County Will Comply With Bail Reform Order, U.S.
NEWS (June 7, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/texas/article/2017
-06-07/the-latest-supreme-court-allows-poor-houston-inmates-freed [https://perma
.cc/63ZE-Y6AP]. As of June 1, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the
district court decision. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). Notably,
in 2017, Louisiana’s Attorney General, Jeff Landry, joined a legal brief defending the
Harris County bail system. Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana AG Jeff Landry enters case
defending Texas bail system, NOLA.COM (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.nola.com
/politics/index.ssf/2017/08/landry_cash_bail.html [https://perma.cc/94FW-NWVY].
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however, recent research suggests that the other Texas counties and
jurisdictions around the country should follow suit.133
Additionally, although not using the Arnold Foundation’s PSA, other
jurisdictions have passed laws or rules—either in the past or in recent
years—to reform pretrial practices by decreasing or eliminating the use of
cash bail.134 For instance, the District of Columbia amended its bail laws
in the early 1990s.135 Now, “although secured money bail is still available
under the D.C. Code, such bail is almost never imposed in misdemeanor
cases.”136 More recently, Alaska passed a law in July 2016, which portions
went in to effect on January 1, 2018, that created the Pretrial Enforcement
Division.137 The Division’s purpose is to use a pretrial assessment
instrument to determine the risk of defendants and place them in one of
three categories, which in turn determines whether they are eligible for
pretrial release on their own recognizance.138 One study suggested that
Alaska taxpayers could save $380 million.139 In July of 2017, the
Maryland Court of Appeals created Court Rule 4-216.1, which “permit[s]
the release of a defendant pending trial except upon a finding by a [judge]
that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant . . . will not
appear when required, or . . . will be a danger to . . . the community.” 140
133. See Dottie Carmichael et al., Liberty and Justice: Pretrial Practices in
Texas, TEX. A&M U. PUB. POLICY RES. INST. (2017).
134. See infra notes 135–42 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 23-1321 (West 2016); Marimow, supra note 36;
What Changed After D.C. Ended Cash Bail, NPR (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.npr
.org/2018/09/02/644085158/what-changed-after-d-c-ended-cash-bail [https://perm
a.cc/J9FE-V9CJ].
136. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Tex., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1078 (S.D. Tex.,
Hous. Div. 2017).
137. See, e.g., 2016 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 36 (S.B. 91); Senate Bill 91:
Summary of Policy Reforms, UAA JUST. CTR. (last updated Sept. 19, 2016),
https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/academics/college-of-health/departments/justice-cen
ter/alaska-justice-forum/33/1spring2016/b_sb91_summary.cshtml [https://perma
.cc/SQ4X-486L]; Bryce Covert, This Deep Red State Just Ended Cash Bail,
APPEAL (Jan. 10, 2018), https://theappeal.org/alaska-ends-its-reliance-on-moneybail-ff1cc0e19730/ [https://perma.cc/UN94-56UW]; Vera Staff, Alaska Moves to
Eliminate Cash Bail, VERA INST. JUST. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.vera
.org/blog/alaska-moves-to-eliminate-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/8PE2-T9SS].
138. See Senate Bill 91: Summary of Policy Reforms, supra note 137; Covert,
supra note 137.
139. Covert, supra note 137.
140. Md. Rules, Rule 4-216.1(b)(1)(B) (West 2017) (emphasis added). For
additional information on bail reform in Maryland, see Master of Public Affairs
Candidates under the supervision of Prof. Ben Jealous, Advancing Bail Reform in
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California is another example, where Governor Brown signed a bill into
law that will completely eliminate cash bail when it takes effect in October
of 2019.141 The law will force courts to establish pretrial assessment
services and will generally require that defendants arrested for non-violent
and low-level offenses be released within 12 hours of being arrested.142
All of these jurisdictions, whether adopting the PSA or other pretrial
assessment strategies, have made strides to reform their bail practices.143
While critics may argue that these jurisdictions are not similar to the
Pelican State, research from Louisiana’s neighbor, Texas, suggests that
risk assessment tools may be useful anywhere.144
C. A Neighbor State’s Encouraging Research into Risk Assessment Tools
Texas A&M University’s Public Policy Research Institute released a
report on Texas’s pretrial practices in March 2017.145 The report focused
on comparing cash bail and risk assessment-based pretrial systems, and
analyzed over 3.5 years of criminal case data from Tarrant and Travis
counties.146 The data highlighted five critical findings.147
First, the report found that a pretrial risk assessment tool built around
an algorithm could successfully predict a defendant’s chance of failure on
Maryland: Progress and Possibilities, PRINCETON U. SCH. PUB. & INT’L AFF.,
http://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/Advancing_Bail_Reform_In_
Maryland_2018-Feb27_Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY5X-V354] (last updated
Feb. 27, 2018).
141. See 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 224 (S.B. 10) (West).
142. See id.; Khorri Atkinson, California becomes first state to fully abolish
cash bail, AXIOS (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.axios.com/california-becomesfirst-state-to-abolish-cash-bail--edd2389e-daa0-4f98-8677-a48d482f46f1.html
[https://perma.cc/V3F6-4KQJ]. But see ACLU of California Statement: Governor
Brown Signs Bail Reform Legislation Opposed by ACLU, ACLU SAN DIEGO &
IMPERIAL COUNTIES (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.aclusandiego.org/aclu-ofcalifornia-statement-governor-brown-signs-bail-reform-legislation-opposed-byaclu/ [https://perma.cc/Y3HF-PNKK] (Opposing California’s particular bail
reform legislation as granting courts too much control).
143. See supra notes 135–42 and accompanying text.
144. See discussion infra Part II.C.
145. Carmichael et al., supra note 133.
146. Id. at xiii. Tarrant County includes the city of Fort Worth and Travis County
includes the city of Dallas. See TARRANT COUNTY, TEX., http://www.tarrant
county.com/en.html [https://perma.cc/44ZS-J2EA] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018);
TRAVIS COUNTY, TEX., https://www.traviscountytx.gov/ [https://perma.cc/FGD7S3PJ] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
147. Carmichael et al., supra note 133, at xiii–xiv.
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bond.148 At the time, Tarrant County and Travis County were using the
Ohio Risk Assessment System: Pretrial Assessment Tool, “ORASPAT.”149 The ORAS-PAT required an extensive interview with the
defendant to determine his flight risk and danger to society.150 The report
concluded that if police used a risk assessment algorithm tool instead of
the interview system, then a higher assessment score accurately portrayed
a greater chance of bond forfeiture and new criminal activity.151
Second, the report found using a statistical algorithm making
decisions to release or detain defendants instead of the interview-based
risk assessment tool would save money.152 The report concluded that the
ORAS-PAT assessment tool was an inefficient use of funds.153 The risk
assessment algorithm could obtain similar results as the costly interview
based system for a fraction of the cost and resources.154 The Arnold
Foundation’s PSA tool is specifically mentioned in the report as a practical
risk assessment tool and a more viable alternative than the ORAS-PAT.155
Third, the study found that risk assessment tools resulted in more
accurate classifications of defendants.156 In terms of classifying defendants
as low-risk or high-risk, under a cash bail system, the judges “matched”
the actual risk for defendants 72% of the time.157 Under a risk assessment
tool using a risk assessment algorithm, the matching to actual risk
improved to 77%.158 This finding shows that with risk assessment
algorithms, jails would release fewer high-risk defendants and detain
fewer low-risk defendants.159
Fourth, the costs of using a risk assessment tool are more than offset
by savings in other areas when defendants are properly classified
pretrial.160 Although pretrial service programs cost 1.5 times more with a

148. Id. at xiii.
149. See id.
150. Ohio Risk Assessment System, OHIO DEP’T REHABILITATION &
CORRECTION, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/oras [https://perma.cc/RX86-2364] (last
visited Aug. 2, 2018). The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
developed the ORAS-PAT assessment tool. Id.
151. Carmichael et al., supra note 133, at xiii.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at xiv.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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risk assessment tool, the costs in every other category decrease.161 For
instance, case processing costs, such as re-arrest, court hearings,
prosecution, and indigent defense, are 5% lower when courts use a risk
assessment tool.162 The monetary costs to victims decrease by 72%.163
Costs of detaining defendants decrease by 23%.164 Additionally, the costs
assessed to the court and judicial system incurred by misclassifying the
risk of defendants are 76% lower.165 Most importantly, the total costs of
all the categories combined are 30% lower than if courts used a cash bail
system.166 These savings are mostly attributed to lower rates of new
criminal activity—high-risk defendants could not commit crimes because
they were detained, and low-risk defendants that were released were less
likely to commit crimes.167
Finally, the report concluded that use of a risk assessment tool is more
fair for defendants because it considers their risk to society’s safety rather
than merely their ability to pay.168 When a risk assessment algorithm
determines whether to detain a defendant rather than the defendant’s
inability to pay bail, half as many people are incarcerated on a bail of
$2,000 or less, one-third as many people are held on bails of $500 or less,
and ten times as many people are released on their own recognizance.169
The report adds to the great body of contemporary evidence promoting
risk assessment systems.170
Many jurisdictions have realized the issues associated with cash bail
systems and have adopted the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at xiv–xv. The study determined that when risk assessment is not used,
more high-risk defendants are able to secure pretrial release solely based on their
ability to pay. Id. at 27. The high-risk defendants, in turn, are more likely to
commit crimes, causing damage to victims, while out of jail on bond than lowrisk defendants, who can be safely released pretrial knowing that they are less
likely to commit crimes. Id. Thus, if Tarrant County and Travis County used a
risk-assessment tool, victim costs would be 3.5 times lower than in a money-bail
system. Id. at 28.
164. Id. at xiv–xv.
165. Id.
166. Id. at xv.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See generally id.
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Assessment tool or another similar risk assessment system.171 If Louisiana
adopts the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool like other
jurisdictions have, the state will adopt contemporary, progressive bail
bond reform.172
III. VALUABLE REASONS FOR LOUISIANA TO REPLACE OUTDATED CASH
BAIL
Louisiana has already shown an interest in assessing its criminal
justice system and incarcerating more efficiently.173 To get “more public
safety for each dollar spent,” the legislature created the Louisiana Justice
Reinvestment Task Force, which studies Louisiana’s criminal justice
system and makes recommendations to safely cut the costs of operation.174
The Task Force and the Louisiana Department of Corrections already
support LARNA175 and TIGER,176 two risk assessment tools used to
determine the risk of recidivism for prisoners released after serving time
post-conviction.177 Further, while this Comments suggests the legislature
should take statewide action, smaller jurisdictions, like Orleans Parish,
have already taken steps to reduce the use of cash bail.178

171. See Schuppe, supra note 86. See also list of jurisdictions that have
adopted the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment Tool to date, supra
note 118.
172. See supra note 171.
173. See LA. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 29.
174. Id. at 6.
175. The Louisiana Risk Needs Assessment (“LARNA”) “identif[ies] an
individual’s likelihood of reoffending and inform[s] supervision levels for those
on probations and parole.” Id. at 24.
176. The Louisiana Department of Corrections is “developing and piloting”
the Targeted Interventions Gaining Enhanced Reentry (“TIGER”) tool, which is
“a new risk and needs assessment tool that improves upon the LARNA.” Id.
177. Id.
178. The New Orleans City Council eliminated cash bail for defendants
charged with minor city offenses in 2017. Kevin Litten, New Orleans City Council
votes to end jailing of indigent offenders on minor crimes, NOLA.COM (Jan. 12,
2017), https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/01/city_council_bail_over
haul.html [https://perma.cc/XVH8-SH7N]. Recently, New Orleans Mayor
LaToya Cantrell wrote about her desire to use the Arnold Foundation’s PSA tool.
LaToya Cantrell & Jason Williams, Smart bail reform is about promoting safety,
equity and justice, NOLA.COM (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.nola.com/opinions
/index.ssf/2018/10/bail_reform_new_orleans_1.html [https://perma.cc/95WB-38
RX]. Even two New Orleans Saints players have spoken out against cash bail
systems. Demario Davis & Benjamin Watson, Jailing people just because they
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If Louisiana follows trends from other jurisdictions that have adopted
the Public Safety Assessment tool, the state will achieve its other goals
including lowering jail populations, reducing jail detention costs, and
stopping the indiscriminate hindrance the cash bail system places on
indigent Louisianans.179
A. Louisiana Could Cash in on Lower Jail Populations
If Louisiana courts could assess defendants detained pretrial using a
risk assessment tool, courts could safely release many defendants on their
own recognizance until trial.180 It is estimated that city and parish jails in
Louisiana detain just over 14,000 defendants pretrial.181 Although no
available data directly shows how many courts statewide detain
defendants because of inability to pay bail, the number is likely similar to
other reported statistics showing courts detain nearly a third of pretrial
inmates because of financial inabilities.182
For example, of the people detained in the Orleans Justice Center—
Orleans Parish’s jail—in March 2016, the state had convicted only 10%;
jails were detaining the other 90% pretrial.183 In 2015, New Orleans judges
imprisoned 2,482 people solely because they could not pay their court
costs and fees.184 In 2015, three out of ten jail beds in Orleans Parish were
filled by defendants due to their inability to afford the bail set by the

can’t afford bail doesn’t make us safer, NOLA.COM (Sept. 30, 2018),
https://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2018/09/money_bail_new_orleans.htm
l [https://perma.cc/RF6B-N27X].
179. See generally NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, supra note 113; Sullivan, supra
note 115.
180. See New Orleans: Who’s in Jail and Why?, VERA INST. JUST. 1–2, https:
//storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/new-orleans-jailpopulation-quarterly-report/legacy_downloads/Jail-Population-First-QuarterlyReport-Jan-March_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2MK-4XXQ] (last visited Sept. 30,
2018); PSA Research, supra note 36.
181. Incarceration Trends: Louisiana, supra note 31.
182. See generally New Orleans: Who’s in Jail and Why?, supra note 180.
183. Id.
184. Times-Picayune Editorial Board, New Orleans works to free people who
are in jail because they can’t pay bond: Editorial, NOLA.COM (Nov. 18, 2016),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/11/new_orleans_jail_bond.html
[https://perma.cc/G6CQ-VRD4]. Further, of the defendants in that period, jails
imprisoned 38% at least in part because they could not pay their bail. In total,
almost 1,500 people spent over 30 days in jail because they could not pay their
bail. Id.
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court.185 If courts examined the defendants under a risk assessment tool,
some would be eligible to be released on their own recognizance.186
Most defendants booked into the criminal justice system both
nationally and in Louisiana are charged with crimes that do not carry a
potential life sentence.187 If Louisiana adopts a risk assessment system
similar to New Jersey, therefore, most of the pretrial defendants will be
eligible for release by the risk assessment tool.188 New Jersey saw a 20%
reduction in its statewide jail population in the six months following the
implementation of the PSA.189 Louisiana could see a similar reduction in
its jail population if the state adopts the PSA.190 If jails released 20% of
the 14,000 pretrial defendants, equal to New Jersey’s reduction, Louisiana
courts would release 2,800 defendants safely on their own recognizance
within six months of the PSA’s implementation.191
B. With Lower Jail Populations, Louisiana Could Save on Detention
Costs
With fewer defendants in jails, the cost of maintaining Louisiana jails
would reduce.192 One report estimates the average daily cost of an inmate
in a Louisiana jail is $24.39, by far the lowest allocation of any state. 193
Thus, the average annual cost of detaining one defendant in a local jail is
estimated as $8,902.194 Presuming that Louisiana’s jail populations
185. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33.
186. See PSA Research, supra note 36.
187. See LA. COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN LOUISIANA 2013 (2013).
188. See PSA Research, supra note 36; Sullivan, supra note 115.
189. See supra note 188. See also NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, supra note 94. The
New Jersey Judiciary estimated that pretrial detention decreased by 20% over the
first year of implementation and decreased by 35% over three years. Id.
190. See supra note 188.
191. Math can be difficult for lawyers and law students. Twenty percent of
14,000 is 2,800.
192. See generally Christian Henrichson, Joshua Rinaldi & Ruth Delaney, The
Price of Jails: Measuring the Taxpayer Cost of Local Incarceration, VERA INST.
JUST. (May 2015), https://www.vera.org/publications/the-price-of-jails-measuringthe-taxpayer-cost-of-local-incarceration [https://perma.cc/WVR2-3LPH]; Sullivan,
supra note 115.
193. Cindy Chang, Louisiana is the world’s prison capital, NOLA.COM (May
13, 2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/05/louisiana_is_the_worlds
_prison.html [https://perma.cc/FY2E-9SYA].
194. A $24.39 per diem multiplied by 365 days equals an $8,902.35 annual
cost to detain a defendant. For comparison, in 2015, one report calculated that the
average nationwide annual cost of keeping a defendant in a local or county jail
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decline, like in New Jersey, the jail population could reduce by 20% in six
months.195 The decrease in jail costs for Louisiana parishes and cities could
be nearly $25 million across the state.196
Jurisdictions only recently began adopting risk-based assessment
tools,197 thus, the statistics released reflect only months of reform—not
reductions following a full fiscal year or more time for the new system to
fully integrate itself into statistics.198 Even the example used—a 20%
reduction in New Jersey—comes after only six months of the tool’s

was $47,057. Henrichson, Rinaldi & Delaney, supra note 192. The lowest
reported annual detention cost of that particular study was $17,396 in Cherokee
County, Georgia. Id.
195. See discussion supra Part III.A, which calculates that Louisiana could see
a 2,800 reduction in defendants detained pretrial in first six months of
implementation; see Sullivan, supra note 115.
196. A 20% reduction of the estimated 14,000 people detained pretrial in
Louisiana jails would mean 2,800 defendants potentially removed from jail as
low-risk. By jails not detaining those 2,800 defendants, averaging a cost of $8,902
each, Louisiana’s parishes and cities could save an estimated $24,926,580. Of
course, implementing pretrial service systems would cost money, meaning that
this is not the end of the budgetary math problem. In fact, the New Jersey Judiciary
estimated that a dedicated funding stream would be needed to continue at current
operation, rather than relying on just court costs and fees. See NEW JERSEY
J UDICIARY, supra note 94. Proponents of pretrial service systems advocate,
however, that over time, the money saved by not detaining low-risk individuals
outweighs the cost of maintaining a pretrial services system. The Pretrial Justice
Institute compiled statistics on jurisdictions that have seen cost reductions after
implementation of pretrial service systems. Pretrial Justice, How Much Does It
Cost?, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System
/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=4c666992-0b1b-632a-13cb-b
4ddc66fadcd [https://perma.cc/UNS7-UP4F] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018). These
successful systems vary in jurisdiction-wide cost because of the various factors
unique to each jurisdiction that determine how much funding is needed. Id. The
Pretrial Justice Institute, along with the National Center for State Courts, even
released a report to guide jurisdictions in creating and funding a pretrial services
system and what factors to consider when doing so. Estimating the Costs of
Implementing Pretrial Assessment and Monitoring Services, PRETRIAL JUST.
INST. & N AT’L C TR. FOR S T. CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites
/Files/PJCC/Estimating%20the%20Costs%20of%20Implementing%20Pretrial%2
0Assessmnt%20and%20Monitoring%20Services%20PJI%20and%20NCSC.ashx
[https://perma.cc/4NQK-KT68] (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).
197. See PSA Research, supra note 36.
198. See Sullivan, supra note 115.
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usage.199 If the calculations are remotely accurate, parishes in Louisiana
could see budget reductions that surpass these preliminary figures.
The New Orleans cash bail system already runs a deficit.200 The Vera
Institute of Justice in New Orleans gathered data on the money that the
local government collected when defendants paid bail and the costs
associated with jailing defendants pretrial.201 The results showed that the
cost to the government, which is the cost of detaining defendants who
could not pay or had violated the terms of their bail, was higher than the
obtainable revenue from those defendants’ bail payments.202
In New Orleans, bail bondsmen charge a 10% premium for bonds,203
plus an additional fee of 3% of a defendant’s bail, which is then distributed
to the court, the district attorney, the public defender, and the sheriff.204 In
2015, New Orleans defendants paid over $6.4 million to bail bondsmen;
bondsmen then split those fees between themselves and the government
entities that receive a fraction.205 From this amount, the courts,
prosecutors, public defenders, and sheriffs collected a total of $4.5 million
from defendants and their families.206
During that same period, the City of New Orleans spent $6.4 million
solely detaining defendants that could not pay their bail.207 The city thus
spent almost $2 million more to jail the indigent defendants who could not
pay their bail than the involved criminal justice agencies collected as
revenue from requiring bail be paid.208 Adopting a risk-assessment-based
system would alleviate such costs that parish and local jail systems incur
around the state. Additionally, only low-risk defendants would be eligible
for release, meaning that courts would more effectively target those
defendants deemed high-risk because of their potential to commit another
crime or flee the jurisdiction for pretrial detention.209

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
See Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
See PSA Research, supra note 36.
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C. Risk Assessment Tools Mean Safer Streets
The PSA identifies high-risk defendants as those that are most likely
to flee or commit another crime.210 The defendants that the tool selects for
pretrial detention, therefore, will be those that are most dangerous to
society.211 Rather than a defendant’s ability to pay being the sole
determination, the factors important to the safety of the community will
determine which defendants jails should detain.212 Society need not fear
because the defendants released on their own recognizance will be
judicially determined to be low-risk, and the defendants that are detained
will be determined to be those that are more likely to endanger the
community.213 This logic, however, is not without its challengers.214
Opponents of risk-assessment-based systems and proponents of cash
bail systems spread the “persistent myth in America that money bail—and
the dogged bondsman who will track down absconders—makes
communities safer.”215 Predictably, opponents of reform continue to argue
that eliminating cash bail systems threatens the safety of communities.216
Opponents’ concerns are that bail reform legislation will lead to the release
of criminal defendants who will continue to commit crimes if jails are not
detaining them.217
While there are examples of jails releasing low-risk defendants
nationwide on their own recognizance and prosecutors then charging the
defendants with crimes while awaiting their trial,218 defendants under cash
bail systems often commit crimes after satisfying their bail payment.219
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See immediately infra.
215. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33, at 9.
216. See, e.g., DeRosier, supra note 109; Ronald Kessler, I Set a Defendant Free
And Got Blamed When He Raped Someone, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/31/i-set-a-defendant-free-and-got-blam
ed-when-he-raped-someone [https://perma.cc/6P42-2CSM]; Nicholas Pugliese, Bail
bond industry mounts another attack on N.J. reforms, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Aug. 7,
2017), http://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-jersey/2017/08/07/bail-bond-indus
try-mounts-another-attack-n-j-reforms/539366001/ [https://perma.cc/NT9P-Z8ER].
217. See, e.g., supra note 216.
218. See, e.g., supra note 216.
219. See generally Joshua Rhett Miller, Slain student’s ex was out on bail on
rape charge, N.Y. POST (Oct. 13, 2017), http://nypost.com/2017/10/13/victimadvocate-says-slain-students-ex-should-have-been-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/V4CG
-ZZ7Z]; Austin Montgomery, Out on Bail, Suspected of Gunplay, BELOIT DAILY
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One particularly gruesome example occurred when Matthew Darby
allegedly killed his ex-girlfriend, Alina Sheykhet, while on bail for two
separate charges from two different jurisdictions, one for rape and the
other for criminal trespass.220 Darby had bonded out on both offenses, each
worth $10,000.221 The rape charge, which came about nine months prior,
related to an incident in which Darby broke into Sheykhet’s apartment and
raped her.222 In Wisconsin, police arrested Andy “Man Man” Davis after
he allegedly fired 30 shots into a home, leaving two people injured.223
Davis, just two months prior, had posted his $6,000 bond for a 2015
shooting incident.224
Louisiana has seen similar difficulties with defendants released after
paying bail.225 In Monroe, police arrested Blake Phillips and charged him
with stalking a woman, whom he reportedly threatened to kill.226 After
posting bail and agreeing to a protective order, Phillips was charged for
violating the protective order.227 The Ouachita Correctional Center released
Phillips again after he posted the $7,000 bail for the second charge.228
In Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Police shot and killed Jordan Frazier,
who was out on bail for a charge of possession with intent to distribute
ecstasy, after he exited a vehicle with a firearm during a traffic stop.229
Frazier had previously been convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia,
simple criminal damage to property, criminal trespass, and aggravated
assault.230 Telly Hankton, whom police once called the most dangerous

NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.beloitdailynews.com/article/20170929/ARTI
CLE/170929714 [https://perma.cc/E3X9-AU2U].
220. Miller, supra note 219.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Montgomery, supra note 219.
224. Id.
225. See generally Ashley Mott, Monroe chef accused of texting stalking
victim, again, NEWS STAR (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.thenewsstar.com/story
/news/crime/2017/12/13/celebrity-chef-phillips-accused-stalking-again/9480350
01/ [https://perma.cc/TX5X-CQU9]; Grace Toohey, Man killed by Baton Rouge
police was free on bail, exited vehicle with gun during traffic stop, police say,
ADVOCATE (Jun. 14, 2017), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news
/crime_police/article_39d03f9a-5114-11e7-b79a-037e9f8fa223.html [https://per
ma.cc/8YZA-RBZ2]; Covert, supra note 2.
226. Mott, supra note 225.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Toohey, supra note 225.
230. Id.
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criminal in New Orleans, shot and killed a rival gangster while out on a $1
million bail for a murder charge.231
These accounts are instances in which a defendant avoided detention by
paying bail and was subsequently involved in another crime. Instead of
money determining whether a particular defendant should be allowed
pretrial release, the PSA tool only considers factors relevant to the likelihood
that a defendant will commit another crime if released pretrial.232 In Lucas
County, Ohio, a jurisdiction that has adopted the tool, statistics show that
the tool is effectively deciding whom the courts can release safely.233
Comparing arrests before and after the tool’s implementation, the county
reported that the number of pretrial defendants arrested for other crimes had
been cut in half.234 Furthermore, the number of pretrial defendants skipping
their court dates dropped by over 10%.235 Ultimately, the arguments against
implementation of a risk assessment tool fall short of proving cash bail’s
superiority.
D. Bail Bondsmen’s Arguments Do Not Pay Out
Bail bondsmen argue that bail bond reform adversely affects them, as
it is detrimental to their business.236 In New Orleans alone, commercial
bail bond companies receive $4.7 million from defendants each year.237
Kirk Shaw, a bail bondsman from New Jersey, after the Bail Reform and
Speedy Trial Act passed, articulated his role in the criminal justice system
as that of “a short-term loan officer,” explaining that the fee he charges is
akin to “interest on your loan.”238 Shaw further explains that under “[t]he
231. Covert, supra note 2.
232. See PSA Research, supra note 36.
233. New data: Pretrial risk assessment tool works to reduce crime, increase
court appearances, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www
.arnoldfoundation.org/new-data-pretrial-risk-assessment-tool-works-reduce-crimeincrease-court-appearances/ [https://perma.cc/X4NE-94FK].
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Sulaiman Abdur-Rahman, New Jersey bail reform threatens bond
agents, sparks criminal justice debate, TRENTONIAN (May 14, 2017), http://www
.trentonian.com/article/TT/20170514/NEWS/170519882 [https://perma.cc/CU5RK4TC]; In New Jersey, Sweeping Reforms Deliver Existential Threat To Bail Bonds
Industry, NPR, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (July 6, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017
/07/06/535823170/in-new-jersey-sweeping-reforms-deliver-existential-threat-tobail-bonds-industry [https://perma.cc/BXH3-AK44].
237. See Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33.
238. In New Jersey, Sweeping Reforms Deliver Existential Threat To Bail
Bonds Industry, supra note 236.
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old system, you’d have skin in the game,” however, after New Jersey’s
Bail Reform and Speedy Trial Act, the state’s court system is “a joke.”239
Although instances of defendants released without bail committing crimes
while they await trial exist, despite the likely profit-motivated arguments
of bail bondsmen, no evidence exists that collecting bail money from
defendants is an effective crime deterrent.240
The bail reform evidence shows that defendants released without bail
are just as likely to appear in court and avoid new arrests as people who
are able to pay bail.241 Using a risk assessment tool is safer than using a
cash bail system.242 The Vera Institute’s data shows that defendants
unnecessarily detained pretrial are more likely to commit future crimes.243
If defendants are determined to be low-risk, allowing them to return to
their lives while they await trial may decrease this likelihood.244 Risk
assessment tools also prevent high-risk defendants with means to pay bail
from purchasing their freedom.245 No conclusive evidence exists that
requiring defendants to pay bail makes communities safer—in fact, there
is evidence that pretrial detention has the opposite effect.246 With no
persuasive evidence to the contrary, adopting a risk assessment-based
system is economically and morally sound.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana has made recent strides in criminal reform, yet still has one
of the highest incarceration rates in the entire world.247 By reducing
Louisiana’s jail population, the parishes and cities of Louisiana would
reduce spending on unnecessarily detaining defendants.248 Louisiana has
239. Id.
240. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33, at 9.
241. Id.
242. Id. See also New data: Pretrial risk assessment tool works to reduce
crime, increase court appearances, supra note 233 (reporting evidence of Lucas
County’s shrinking pretrial defendant arrests).
243. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson supra note 33, at 9. See also Christopher T.
Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand & Alexander Holsinger, Investigating the Impact
of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND.
(Nov. 2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJA
F_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/U94R-AA9B].
244. See supra note 243.
245. Id.
246. Id. See also New data: Pretrial risk assessment tool works to reduce
crime, increase court appearances, supra note 233.
247. See supra note 30.
248. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.
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already begun to recognize and address the problems of its criminal justice
system,249 and bail bond reform could be a systematic change to push
Louisiana toward its goal.250
To reduce the number of pretrial defendants jails detain solely because
they cannot afford to pay bail, and to ensure that jails detain only the
defendants that are most dangerous to society, Louisiana should adopt the
Arnold Foundation Public Safety Assessment tool or a similar risk
assessment tool. The tool will efficiently reduce the number of people
imprisoned unnecessarily, reducing jail populations around the state, and
lowering expenses associated with detaining defendants.251
The Louisiana Legislature should abolish the discriminatory and
ineffective cash bail system in its entirety, and following the example of
other jurisdictions, replace it with a system that more appropriately focuses
on pretrial risk assessment. This change will bring Louisiana to the
forefront of the nationwide bail bond reform movement, ultimately
benefitting the state both socially and economically.
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249. See LA. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 29.
250. See discussion supra Part III.
251. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.
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